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Abstract
This paper, based upon research financed by the Inland Revenue and the Contributions Agency of
the DSS, presents calculations of the compliance costs for employers of PAYE and National
Insurance in 1995–96. Total costs are estimated to have been of the order of £1.3 billion. The costs
are very unequally spread across employers, whether measured per employee or per pound of tax
raised. They are particularly high for small new employers. For the largest employers, these costs
may be offset by the cash-flow benefits of acting as tax collectors. The composition of labour and
other costs is calculated and estimates are made of compliance costs under various payroll
‘technologies’. The main determinants of compliance costs, for an employer, are analysed using
weighted least-squares regression analysis. Finally, some policy implications are considered.
JEL classification: H2.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is based on research carried out by the Centre for Fiscal Studies at the
University of Bath for the Board of Inland Revenue and the Department of
Social Security, including the Contributions Agency.
1 It was commissioned in
                                                                                                                                   
*Both authors are at the Centre for Fiscal Studies, University of Bath.
The authors are grateful to Dr Phillip Rice for comments. The opinions expressed are entirely those of the
authors and in no way imply endorsement by the Inland Revenue or the Department of Social Security.
1The team carrying out the research were David Collard and Michael Godwin of the University of Bath and Sue
Green of Bristol University. The survey conditions protected the confidentiality of respondents, and all
information collected on individuals or companies remains confidential to the University of Bath and will not
be revealed to the Inland Revenue or third parties.Fiscal Studies
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October 1995 and published in November 1998.
2 The subject matter of the
research was the compliance costs borne by employers in collecting income tax
under Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) and National Insurance (NI) contributions. The
period studied (1995–96) was that immediately preceding the introduction of
self-assessment.
There are three costs associated with taxation (apart from the transfer itself):
the ‘excess burden’ of a tax, its administrative costs and its compliance costs.
Compliance costs may be defined as ‘the costs incurred by taxpayers in meeting
the requirements laid upon them by the tax law and the revenue authorities ...
over and above the actual payment of tax and over and above any distortion costs
inherent in the nature of the tax; costs which would disappear if the tax was
abolished’ (Sandford, 1995, p. 1). They were certainly known to classical
economists. Thus two of Adam Smith’s famous canons of taxation (certainty and
convenience) were wholly concerned with compliance costs. Another canon
(‘economy’) related to both administrative costs and compliance costs: ‘every
tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out of the pockets of the people as
little as possible over and above what it brings in to the public treasury of the
state: ... taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than they
are beneficial to the sovereign’ (Smith, 1776, bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2). Following
Smith, McCulloch (1845) also referred at various points in his Treatise to what
we would now call compliance costs.
3 Public finance economists have, however,
tended to concentrate on excess or ‘dead-weight’ burden to the relative neglect
of compliance costs. Modern research on the measurement of compliance costs
in the UK dates from Sandford’s pioneering study (1973). Since that time, it has
grown rapidly. Compliance cost research for the UK system has been described
by Godwin in Sandford (1973), which also contains excellent accounts of
research across a range of taxes and countries.
4 The importance of compliance
costs in the formulation of UK tax policy has been officially recognised since
1985 when ‘compliance cost assessments’ (CCAs) of proposed tax changes were
instituted as part of the Thatcher government’s Deregulation Initiative. The
Labour government, acknowledging that some regulation was desirable, replaced
the previous system with a Better Regulation Unit and Regulatory Impact
Assessments (RIAs), which are intended to be simpler and more flexible.
5
                                                                                                                                   
2Collard, Godwin and Green (1998): The Tax Compliance Costs for Employers of PAYE and National
Insurance in 1995–6, Volume 1: Main Report, Inland Revenue Economics Paper no. 3, which is available from
Somerset House (price £20) or on the Internet (http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/mis.htm);  Volume 2:
Appendices A–F is available from the Centre for Fiscal Studies, University of Bath, BA2 7AY (price £60). For
convenience, these reports are referred to as the Bath Report vols 1 and 2.
3Indeed, O’Brien notes (McCulloch, 1845, p. xviii) that he rejected Smith’s ‘benefit’ maxim while emphasising
‘certainty’, ‘convenience’ and ‘economy’.
4For an account of tax compliance costs in the US, see Blumenthal and Slemrod (1995).
5For a useful account of this change and of Tax Impact Statements throughout the OECD, see Evans and
Walpole (1999).Compliance Costs for Employers
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The present study was intended to provide a ‘bench-mark’ picture of
employers’ compliance costs in respect of PAYE and NI. The quantitative results
reported are drawn from over 1,300 responses to a large-scale postal
questionnaire (see the appendix).
II. THE MEASUREMENT OF COMPLIANCE COSTS
The main approach adopted was to build up a picture of compliance costs for
each payroll starting from the time spent on compliance activities. Thus the
numbers of hours spent each month and at the end of the tax year in dealing with
PAYE, NI contributions, Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) and Statutory Maternity Pay
(SMP) etc. were requested for the relevant payroll scheme. These include
activities undertaken by directors, partners, managerial and other staff.
Respondents were requested to ‘try to exclude, as far as possible, the costs of
payroll activities not associated with PAYE, NI, SSP, and SMP administration’.
Working time was valued at the respondents’ own valuations. In grossing up
from the sample to the population as a whole, however, alternative calculations
were carried out using New Earnings Survey figures. Over and above these
labour costs, adjustments were made to include costs such as fees paid to
bookkeepers, accountants and bureaux, various direct costs including computer
software and hardware, and shares of overhead costs where they could be
attributed. This method of adding up specific costs gives a measure which it is
convenient to refer to as ‘additive’ costs (the ‘default’ case). Employers were
also asked to provide a separate summary estimate of their compliance costs; it is
convenient to refer to this summary cost as ‘reported’ cost. Since the size
distribution of payrolls is highly skewed, compliance costs were initially grossed
up from the payrolls in the sample to all payrolls
6 for each size band separately.
Given the means and standard deviations within each size band, the means and
confidence limits for aggregate compliance costs were estimated using standard
methods for grouped data. A cross-check on whether the grossing-up exercise
gave reliable results was carried out by using the same method to ‘predict’
aggregates whose total was known, i.e. total PAYE and NI paid and total
employment, both by size band. These checks proved to be satisfactory.
The grossed-up figure varies depending on the assumptions made, but six out
of the nine methods considered give a grossed-up valuation in the region of £1.3
billion. The preferred method
7 is based on additive costs with employers’ own
estimates of their size bands, as at March 1996, and of their payment rates. This
gave a total of £1.32 billion with lower and upper confidence limits of £1.14
billion and £1.50 billion respectively. To put this figure of £1.32 billion in
                                                                                                                                   
6That is to say, the 1.2 million payrolls dealt with by the Inland Revenue.
7The other methods used aggregations based on July 1995 employment, separate ‘special’ samples and two
variations of wage imputation from the New Earnings Survey.Fiscal Studies
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perspective, it represents approximately 1.3 per cent of PAYE paid and NI
contributions (classes 1 and 1A) or 0.2 per cent of gross domestic product. Table
1 shows how total costs are spread across the ‘special’
8 samples and the size
bands. The very large proportion of costs falling on small and medium-sized
employers is discussed in Section III.
III. THE ‘REGRESSIVITY’ OF COMPLIANCE COSTS
Compliance costs are regressive
9 in that they fall more heavily on smaller
employers. This is demonstrated here by the calculation of the following:
•   the Gini coefficient;
•   compliance costs as a percentage of revenue collected;
•   compliance costs per employee by size band, particularly for very small and
for new employers.
                                                                                                                                   
8These related to government, forces, overseas and pensions payrolls.
9It is convenient to use the term ‘regressive’ here but it does not, of course, necessarily imply regressivity across
households.
TABLE 1
Grossed-Up Compliance Costs, 1995–96
Thousands of pounds
Payroll type or size band Additive compliance costs Additive compliance costs
per payroll
















aFigures excluded as not meaningful for these categories.Compliance Costs for Employers
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1. The Gini Coefficient
Figure 1 shows cumulative compliance costs against cumulative PAYE and NI
paid. It is easily seen, for example, that the ‘bottom’ 30 per cent of employers
incur about 75 per cent of total compliance costs. The Gini coefficient is 0.67.
10
FIGURE 1
Cumulative Percentage of Additive Costs and Total PAYE and NI Payments,
1995–96
                                                                                                                                   


























































Compliance Costs as a Percentage of PAYE and NI Paid, 1995–96










2. Compliance Costs as a Percentage of Tax Collected
Table 2 shows essentially the same information where compliance costs are
expressed as a percentage of PAYE plus NI collected across the size bands.
11 It
is clear from the table that tax collection via employers with fewer than 50
employees is substantially less efficient in terms of compliance cost per pound
raised than is tax collection via larger employers.
TABLE 3
Mean Additive and Reported Costs Per Employee
for Comparable Cases and for Whole Sample, 1995–96
Pounds






1–4 315 263 288
5–9 149 141 143
10–49 93 87 89
50–99 58 66 58
100–499 41 50 41
500–999 31 36 29
1,000–4,999 30 19 29
5,000+ 6 8 5
                                                                                                                                   
11There are various ways of doing this calculation. The table is based on the 754 cases where both additive
costs and PAYE plus NI are given.Compliance Costs for Employers
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3. Compliance Costs Per Employee: All Employers
The first two columns of Table 3 give compliance costs per employee for the 740
cases in which respondents answered both the additive cost and ‘reported’ cost
questions. The final column gives compliance costs per employee for the whole
sample (1,304 cases).
4. Compliance Costs Per Employee: Small and New Employers
Costs falling on the smallest employers are clearly of interest, as high
compliance costs may be a factor in inhibiting the establishment and expansion
of micro-businesses. Even the smallest employer has to become familiar with his
or her tax obligations, set up a rudimentary system, store tax documentation, deal
with enquiries and so on. Because of this ‘fixed’ element, one would expect
them to have high compliance costs per employee. The costs shown in Tables 3
and 4 are consistent with the illustrations from the regression analysis in Section
VII.
It was expected that employers who are both small and inexperienced (with
one to four employees and less than two years’ experience) would have high
compliance costs. This expectation is supported by the data in Table 5, though
only 13 ‘small, inexperienced’ employers provided sufficient information for
calculating additive cost. The evidence from employers in this smallest category
suggests that particular attention needs to be paid to their problems.
TABLE 4
Compliance Costs Per Employee for Very Small Employers, 1995–96







Compliance Costs Per Employee for Small Inexperienced Employers, 1995–96
Inexperienced employer (13 cases) £404
Experienced employer (91 cases) £281Fiscal Studies
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IV. CASH-FLOW BENEFITS
Employers, as tax collectors, hold tax and NI payments from the pay date to the
19
th of the following month. It may therefore be argued that they enjoy a ‘cash-
flow benefit’ over that period. The cash flow may be used to reduce an overdraft
or other borrowing, to extend trade credit or make short-term loans. From the
standpoint of the community as a whole, this cannot, of course, be a net benefit,
as it is essentially a transfer from taxpayers in general to employers. But the
benefit can, in principle, be very substantial for employers who collect large
amounts of tax. Respondents provided data relating to pay dates and total PAYE
and NI paid. Since we did not have data on liquidity or on the interest rates
relevant to individual employers, the cash-flow benefit was taken to be the
average retail banks’ base rate on revenue collected, for the relevant period (6.58
per cent).
To illustrate the method used, consider an employer who pays staff monthly
on the 24
th and hands tax over to the Collector promptly on the 19
th of the
following month. In a 30-day month, tax is held for six days plus 18 days in the
following month. So the annual value of the cash-flow benefit may be
approximated by T×(6/366+18/366) ×6.58%, where T is annual PAYE and NI
contributions collected. However, only 40 per cent of respondents paid solely
monthly, and there was a wide variation in pay dates, with some variation in
collection frequency. A separate calculation was therefore made, similar to that
described above, for each respondent.
The results of these cash-flow calculations are summarised in Table 6. The
overall pattern is not very surprising, as cash-flow benefits are roughly
proportional to tax paid and payroll size whereas compliance costs rise less than
proportionately with payroll size.
TABLE 6
Cash-Flow Benefit and Compliance Costs, 1995–96
Pounds
Size band Mean additive costs Mean cash-flow benefit Net mean
compliance costs
1–4 706 35 671
5–9 1,059 95 964
10–49 2,071 407 1,664
50–99 4,204 1,478 2,726
100–499 9,794 3,947 5,847
500–999 21,790 14,796 6,994
1,000–4,999 31,923 38,976 –7,053
5,000+ 53,066 171,850 –118,784
Note: The size bands for additive costs and cash-flow benefits are here reported on a comparable basis, cf.
Table 3.13 in vol. 1 of the Bath Report.Compliance Costs for Employers
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There are several important reservations to be made about these calculations:
1.  As in Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989, pp. 197–200), the inclusion of
employers’ NI contributions in the total implies that the incidence of
employers’ contributions falls essentially upon employees (in their absence,
wage rates would rise). Therefore it was not necessary to ask about the
division of NI payments between employers’ and employees’ contributions.
There is a case to be made that employers’ contributions give a cash-flow
benefit over the grace period only, and to that extent the benefits shown in
Table 6 may be overestimates.
2.  It is assumed that cash-flow benefits to the organisation essentially go to the
employer. If this assumption is relaxed, the estimates of cash-flow benefits to
the employer (though not to the employer and employee together) have to be
revised downwards.
3.  A further possibility is that ‘pay-day’ itself might be ‘endogenous’ in that it is
in some cases earlier than it would have been in the absence of PAYE. Since
bringing pay-day one day forward is expensive, this possibility implies an
overestimation of cash-flow benefits using the present method.
4.  Retail banks’ base rates will be underestimates of the rates that many
businesses have to pay for overdrafts or overestimates of what most (though
not all) employers can earn on deposits.
5.  To the extent that employers regularly make late payments of PAYE and NI
(i.e. after the 19
th of the month), the calculations made in Table 6 will be
underestimates. The calculations assume that all employers pay on the due
date.
For all the above reasons, cash-flow benefits have to be interpreted carefully,
but the differential impact on small and large payrolls is clearly present under all
reasonable assumptions.
V. THE COMPOSITION OF COMPLIANCE COSTS
Labour costs accounted for about 50 per cent of costs and were analysed by
function and by size band. Table 7 summarises this information for grossed-up
costs. Some 80 per cent of labour costs are attributable to routine PAYE/NI and
end-of-year work.  This is interesting because complaints about high cost or
difficulty often relate to SSP/SMP, P11D work (associated with benefits in kind)
and audits, which each account for only about 5 per cent of the total.
The remaining 50 per cent of costs (‘associated’ costs) are summarised in
Table 8. It should be noted that the share of advisers (usually accountants) in
total associated costs is very high for small employers (well over 50 per cent)
and that the shares of both computer hardware and software rise with size.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 7
Labour Costs by Function, 1995–96
Grossed-up percentage
PAYE and NI 67.0
















VI. COMPLIANCE COSTS AND PAYROLL TECHNOLOGY
The technology chosen for payroll purposes will depend on the size and
composition of the payroll. Table 9 shows compliance costs by size and by
record type. Table 10 provisionally identifies least-cost payroll technologies for
the various size ranges.
Manual systems seemed to be the cheapest option for employers with fewer
than 10 employees,
12 but at somewhere between 10 and 50 employees PCs
become cheaper. It was attempted to pick up the effects of technology by adding
dummy variables in a multiple regression analysis (see Section VII). Taking the
use of a PC as the norm, ‘dummies’ were added for employers using only manual
methods, only mainframe or only a bureau. The manual dummy was not
statistically significant, but the use of a mainframe or bureau seemed to reduce
                                                                                                                                   
12The decreasing cost and increasing availability of low-price computers and software since 1996 have made
PCs more attractive even for very small employers.Compliance Costs for Employers
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compliance costs per employee by about £9 to £10 per annum. The regression
analysis strengthens the impression from Table 9 that some employers might be
able to achieve significant savings by switching to a higher technology.
The four main methods of submission are standard documents, (approved)
substitute documents, magnetic tape and other electronic methods. The more
sophisticated submission systems are inevitably associated with larger payrolls
and higher technologies, which are in turn associated with size: some of the
savings from these methods will be due to size rather than submission method.
TABLE 10
Least-Cost Payroll Technologies from Table 9










aDisregarding the final column of Table 9.
TABLE 9
Cost Per Employee by Size Band and by Record Type, 1995–96
Pounds
Size band Manual Adviser Desktop PC Mainframe Bureau More than
one
1–4 216.95 309.11 226.08 — — 495.98
5–9 118.10 151.63 200.35 — — 165.13
10–49 77.49 149.63 81.42 96.09 78.08 110.06
50–99 *94.27 *58.63 46.24 62.16 73.88 57.19
100–499 *17.88 — 27.62 31.62 56.32 46.83
500–999 — — 26.66 27.74 17.79 32.48
1,000–4,999 — — 26.20 18.31 9.30 42.68
5,000+ — — — *7.72 *9.42 4.34
No. of cases 181 27 200 51 69 266
*Five or fewer observations.
Note: In the tables that follow, an ‘adviser’ is normally an accountant and a ‘bureau’ is a specialist agency
that handles all or part of the payroll work.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 11
Compliance Costs Per Employee by Record Type and by Submission Type, 1995–96
Pounds































































Notes: Number of cases is given in parentheses. These were not filtered for ‘more than one record type’ so are
not strictly comparable with Table 9.
Table 11 seems to show that, within any one payroll technology, there are
potentially large savings to be had from changing submission methods.
Unfortunately, there were not enough observations to carry out a full analysis by
payroll technology, submission method and size, so the conclusion can only be
tentative.
VII. THE PAYROLL AND COMPLIANCE COSTS
Intuition suggests that compliance costs are likely to be a function of the size,
composition and rate of change of the payroll as well as of employers’ decisions.
This section makes use of multiple regression analysis in order to explain the
variation of compliance costs across payrolls with differing characteristics. A
major difficulty is that several of the key employment variables are highly
correlated.
13 In this situation, it is possible that the estimated coefficients may be
unstable. There is no unique way of coping with the difficulty, but the economic
logic of the problem suggests that it would be useful to include the institutional
and technological variables and size (i.e. newemp) in the basic regression and to
                                                                                                                                   
13Thus total employment is, of course, almost perfectly correlated with the sum of the number of employees
paid weekly, monthly and in other ways (R=0.99) and with the sum of the number of full-time, part-time,
casual and other employees (R=0.99).Compliance Costs for Employers
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replace newemp by its component parts in subsequent regressions. The method
used was weighted least-squares, with each variable being divided by a power of
the variance of the ‘source’ variable, payepaid, which was not included
elsewhere in the analysis. Statistically insignificant variables were progressively
eliminated, leaving those reported in Tables 12 and 13. In all cases, the
coefficients are in pounds and relate to 1995–96.
TABLE 12
Regression Equations Based on Employment
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3






newemp 1 3 . 9 1 8 . 7 3 ———— 8 4 2 4898
newemp
2 –.0002 –4.75 ——————
nweekpay — — 18.27 7.96 — — 157 959
nweekpay
2 — — –.0011 –3.35 ————
nmthpay — — 14.28 6.90 — — 740 4784
nmthpay
2 — — –.0003 –6.77 ————
ncasuals — — — — 21.24 3.64 53 444
nfts — — — — 13.19 4.60 531 3604
nfts
2 — — — — –.0003 –1.87 — —
npts — — — — 11.05 2.51 129 1080
nftjoin 73.25 12.23 75.48 13.70 76.88 10.12 113 635
nftjoin
2 –.041 –7.42 –.036 –7.68 –.040 –7.31 — —
ndir 413.05 9.94 439.91 10.82 479.30 9.89 2 5
dumpart 43.47 4.92 24.86 2.13 43.90 5.47 — —
dumsole 41.73 2.85 28.60 2.13 52.19 4.78 — —
dumadvis 52.51 1.83 76.59 2.73 87.35 3.04 — —
dumbur –10.23 –2.98 –10.19 –3.29 –10.04 –3.00 — —
dummain –8.91 –2.80 –10.08 –2.84 –10.39 –3.24 — —
Constant 219.74 4.06 90.25 1.51 130.02 2.36 — —
aMeans and standard deviations are given for the sample as a whole; they are available for each variable by size
band from the authors.
Glossary of variables
newemp employment as at March 1996
nweekpay number of weekly paid
nmthpay number of monthly paid
ncasuals number of casuals
nfts number of full-timers
npts number of part-timers
nftjoin number of full-time joiners
ndir number of directors
dumpart partnership dummy




The dummies (weighted by employment) refer to whether or not the organisation is a partnership or sole
proprietorship, whether or not the payroll work is done by a professional adviser (usually an accountant) and




Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Multiple R 0.77 0.82 0.81
R-squared 0.59 0.68 0.65
Degrees of freedom 656+10 558+12 496+12
F statistic 94.03 96.68 76.16
Significance of F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Source variable payepaid payepaid payepaid
Power value 1.0 1.0 1.0
Log likelihood –6515 –5596 –4952
1. Employment-Based Weighted Regression Equation
This equation uses only the total figure for employment and does not attempt to
distinguish between monthly and weekly pay, full-time and part-time
employment etc. (equation 1 in Tables 12 and 13). Variables that proved to be
insignificant at the 5 per cent level (including number of P11Ds and a
government sector dummy) were dropped except for the ‘adviser’ dummy, which
proved to be significant in the employment composition equation and reflected
the high costs of using accountants for routine payroll work. In all of the
regression equations attempted during the study, the variable for the number of
joiners (or the one for the number of leavers, with which it is strongly correlated)
almost always turned out to be important and significant: indeed, it is the most
important single variable. The number of directors was also highly significant,
and face-to-face interviews suggest that it may be acting as a proxy for
compliance work associated with benefits in kind.
The four illustrations in Table 14 show that the equation is versatile and
‘works’ reasonably well across employers of different sizes and types in that it is
consistent with the compliance costs per head reported in Table 3. It is not a bad
rule of thumb for estimating the compliance costs for an employer. Several other
regression equations were run. It had been expected that the number of P11Ds
(an approximation for benefits-in-kind work) and the numbers of SSP/SMP cases
would have been significant in explaining compliance costs, but they were all
rejected as insignificant at the required levels.
2. Pay Frequency
The  employment variable was replaced by the number of monthly-paid
employees and the number of weekly-paid employees (equation 2 in Tables 12
and 13). It was expected that the compliance costs associated with weekly-paidCompliance Costs for Employers
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TABLE 14
Four Illustrations of Employment-Based Equation 1
Illustrative case 1
A sole proprietor takes on a single worker.







A limited company has 100 employees and one director and there are 20 joiners.
Total compliance costs given by equation 1 are (in pounds):
Employees (adjusted for scale economies) 1,389




Total per employee 34.7
Illustrative case 3
A PLC has 1,000 employees and four directors, there are 200 joiners and a bureau is used.
Total compliance costs given by equation 1 are (in pounds):
Employees (adjusted for scale economies) 13,710
Joiners (adjusted for scale economies) 13,010
Directors (no significant scale economies) 1,652
Savings from use of bureau –10,230
Constant 220
Total 18,362
Total per employee 18.4
Illustrative case 4
A PLC has 5,000 employees and 10 directors; there are 1,500 joiners and a mainframe is used.
Total compliance costs given by equation 1 are (in pounds):
Employees (adjusted for scale economies) 64,550
Joiners (adjusted for scale economies) 17,625
Directors (no significant scale economies) 4,130
Savings from use of mainframe –44,550
Constant 220
Total 41,975
Total per employee 8.40Fiscal Studies
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employees would be higher than those associated with monthly-paid employees.
That was indeed the case: the marginal compliance cost of a weekly-paid
employee is about 27 per cent greater than that of a monthly-paid employee. The
other variables and significance levels remained substantially the same as in
equation 1, except that the coefficients on legal form were smaller, the
coefficient on the adviser dummy was higher and the constant term was lower
and not significant at the required level.
3. Employee Composition
Here, the employment figure is replaced by the numbers of full-time, part-time
and casual employees (equation 3 in Tables 12 and 13). The results confirm the
widespread view that casual employment generates high compliance costs
(nearly twice as high as part-time employment).
VIII. TAX REVENUE AND COMPLIANCE COSTS
The previous section explained compliance costs by relating them to the payroll.
The present section uses an alternative measure of size: the total of PAYE and
NI payments by an employer. This measure of size is highly, but not perfectly,
correlated with the employment variable (R=0.94) which, along with its direct
constituent parts, is excluded from the present exercise. Since PAYE paid and NI
paid are highly correlated (R=0.97), the revenue variable (taxpaid) is taken to be
the sum of the two. The ‘source’ variable was this time taken to be newemp,
which was not included in the equation. All potentially relevant variables were
included in a weighted least-squares regression analysis, with non-significant
variables progressively dropped. Only one of the ‘payroll technology’ variables,
and none of the legal form variables, survived this process.
It is fully to be expected that taxpaid will be less powerful than employment
in ‘explaining’ compliance costs, since higher tax payments do not, ceteris
paribus, directly require more processing. In this respect, a tax-based regression
is nothing like as useful as the employment-based regressions of the previous
section and is therefore not put forward as the main explanation of differing
compliance costs. However, this formulation has the advantage that the number
of P11Ds and the number of SSP cases are now significant variables in
explaining compliance costs whereas previously they were swamped by the
employment variables. That is to say, the marginal cost of a P11D was
approximately £9.50 and the marginal cost of an SSP case was approximately
£31.25. There were significant scale economies for SSP but not for P11Ds. ForCompliance Costs for Employers
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TABLE 15
Compliance Costs as Determined by Tax Paid
Variable
a Coefficient t statistic Sample mean Sample
standard
deviation
taxpaid 0.0020 4.35 3.29m 21.94m
taxpaid
2 –3.48×10
–7 –4.34 — —
ndir 152.50 2.34 2 5
nftjoin 38.86 5.16 113 635
dumbur –7.58 –1.98 — —
np11d 9.50 2.28 97 607
nsickemp 31.25 3.26 *95 *476
nsickemp
2 –0.009 –2.97 — —




Degrees of freedom 582+8
F statistic 34.71




*For 1,170 cases. The figures for the 629 employers reporting at least one sick employee were 178 and 638
respectively.
aSee glossary of variables below Table 12. Also:
taxpaid PAYE and NI paid for 1995–96
np11d number of P11Ds issued
nsickemp number of sick employees
example, at very large SSP numbers (1,000), the compliance cost per case falls
to £22.25. Scale economies in tax collection also become important at high
levels of tax payment.
14
IX. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The low overall compliance cost of 1.3 per cent of revenue suggests that the
system as a whole is reasonably efficient. Nevertheless, the Bath Report made a
                                                                                                                                   
14The simplest regression of compliance costs against revenue is:




number of detailed recommendations for reducing compliance costs, nearly all of
which have been accepted and acted upon.
15
Three wider issues are worth further discussion:
1.  One of the major factors affecting compliance costs is the number of joiners,
which proxies for the rate at which the payroll is changing. It would be very
helpful if a way could be found of reducing the costs of dealing with joiners
and leavers while ensuring that the amount of tax-free pay was accurately and
quickly assessed.
2.  The high compliance costs for very small employers, relative to the amount of
tax collected, raise the question of whether PAYE is the best method of tax
collection for them. Other methods are, however, also likely to generate high
compliance costs.
3.  Finally, there would undoubtedly be further savings if PAYE and NI were to
be completely integrated, as is likely in the longer term. But such an
integration raises major issues of policy, including the nature of the
‘insurance’ principle, and is not on the immediate political agenda. In the
mean time, the transfer of the Contributions Agency to the Inland Revenue is
to be welcomed.
APPENDIX: POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLE SELECTION
A size-stratified random sample of 5,195 employers’ payrolls was originally
selected for the research team by the Inland Revenue, using the payroll
16 as the
sampling unit. The sampling fractions were adjusted so as to attempt to obtain
broadly similar numbers across size bands, though very large employers were, in
the event, somewhat under-represented and very small employers over-
represented. The total included 506 ‘special’ samples which were drawn to cover
government, armed forces, overseas and pensions payrolls. The number of
questionnaires returned by respondents was 1,398, of which 1,336 included
sufficient cost details to be analysed. The overall response rate was 30.6 per cent
and the net usable response rate 29.2 per cent (calculated after the transfer of
some of the sample for separate analysis).
The samples and sampling fractions are given in Table A.1. The
questionnaire is reproduced at the end of this article.
                                                                                                                                   
15See Treasury Committee (1999).
16This proved to be troublesome since the ‘payroll’ is not synonymous with the employer, the establishment or
the enterprise. Many employers operated several payrolls and often several payrolls were operated within one
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TABLE A.1
Samples and Sampling Fractions
Sample Sampling fraction
Pensions payrolls 150 0.083
Non-UK 81 0.083
Government 255 0.083









Note: Not including the 100 cases for which size was unknown.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire is reproduced overleaf.